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Abstract 
	  
	  
Conditional (if-then) reasoning has been widely studied in the cognitive literature, and in the 
past decade, neuroimaging studies have started to investigate brain networks recruited to solve these 
logical conditionals. A meta-analysis of these neuroimaging studies of healthy adults has shown that 
conditional arguments are primarily associated with left-lateralized activation in the parietal and 
frontal lobes (Goel, 2007). Beyond logical form, content factors such as belief- logic congruency, 
familiarity, and emotion have been shown to recruit networks different from the main effect of 
reasoning. To date, conditional connectives have not been investigated using traumatic brain injury 
patients, therefore, the goal of this thesis was to study the effect of brain lesions on conditional 
reasoning. 
A whole brain analysis using voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) was conducted 
on 72 neurological patients with unilateral lesions in order to explore the impact of brain lesions on 
reasoning accuracy scores. Results indicated that conditional reasoning with familiar content is  
highly dependent on left hemisphere intactness, whereas right hemisphere volume loss does not 
inhibit performance and in some conditions may even lead to improved performance. In particular, 
we found that familiar believable content failed to benefit patients with left hemisphere lesions. 
Additionally, VLSM analysis isolated a region in the left medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) deemed 
necessary for reasoning with emotional content, the 10 patients with lesions in this cluster performed 
significantly worse than all other patients and controls on emotional conditionals. 
Our findings provide additional evidence that reasoning processes involving familiar content 
are largely left lateralized and that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is specifically engaged in 
reasoning about emotional content. This is the first study to use a lesion analysis to investigate 
conditionals, and thus contributes important new information to the existing neuroimaging literature. 
Keywords: Lesions; Conditional reasoning; Emotion; Belief-logic congruency; Congruency; Familiar 
content; Deductive reasoning; VLSM; Traumatic brain injury
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Introduction 
	  
	  
The conditional form, ‘if … then,’ is central to human inference, allowing people 
to express causal relationships, e.g., if you pet your cat, it will purr; or laws, e.g., if you 
get caught speeding, you will get a ticket; or trade conditions, e.g., if you give me your 
scarf, I’ll give you an umbrella. These are just a few examples of the many ways ‘if- 
then’ conditionals are used in everyday life. Conditional logic is also pivotal in a number 
of domains including computer programming, mathematics, and philosophical discourse. 
For more than 50 years, conditional reasoning has been the focus of rigorous 
investigation in cognitive psychology (Oaksford & Chater, 2010), and more recently 
neuroscience (Goel, 2007; Prado, Chadha, & Booth, 2011). 
Over the past two decades, theories of deductive reasoning have been tested using 
neuroimaging techniques such as position emission tomography (PET) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to look at activation patterns during reasoning (for 
an overview of these neuroimaging studies see Goel, 2007; and Prado et al., 2011). 
Two meta-analyses covering the first decade of deductive neuroimaging research 
indicate that the specific networks activated during reasoning depend on the type of 
deductive argument (e.g. syllogisms, conditionals) and content used to present the 
argument (Goel, 2007). Therefore, neuroimaging findings suggest that reasoning is not a 
unitary brain system as suggested by reasoning theories, but is “dynamically configured 
in response to certain task and environmental cues” (Goel, 2007). These environmental 
cues include differences in experimental stimuli such as content, determinacy, conflict, 
emotion, believability, and familiarity, or the type of deductive argument (i.e. 
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conditional, syllogism, or transitive form) (Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). Thus, 
neuroimaging studies have shown that there are deductive brain networks differentially 
responsive to content and argument form. 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the neural structures necessary 
for deductive reasoning by manipulating the effect of content as patients with brain 
lesions engage in conditional reasoning tasks. Three kinds of content manipulations were 
examined (see Table 1 for an example of all arguments presented): 1) familiarity, familiar 
(i.e. real-world) content versus abstract, unfamiliar content (i.e. A, B, C); 2) congruency, 
congruent arguments that support our beliefs (believable and valid or unbelievable and 
invalid) versus incongruent arguments with logical conclusions that contradict our beliefs 
(believable and invalid or unbelievable and valid); and 3) emotion, emotional content 
(e.g. all Nazis were murderous) versus non-emotional content (e.g. some people are not 
children). Since there are no studies of conditional reasoning involving lesion patients, 
this study seeks to address this gap in neuropsychological studies in addition to validating 
findings derived from brain activation studies with healthy, normal subjects. 
	  
The Role of Content in Reasoning 
	  
Neuroimaging studies have looked at various dimensions of logical reasoning by 
manipulating content aspects such as belief-congruency, familiarity (familiar versus 
unfamiliar), emotion (“hot” and “cold”), and determinacy (determinate conclusions that 
follow from the premises versus indeterminate conclusions) in order to observe how they 
impact the ability of a participant to arrive at logically correct conclusions. For instance, 
Goel (2007) identified neural systems responsible for familiar and unfamiliar content. 
Familiar content engages a left frontal and left temporal network, while unfamiliar 
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content engages a bilateral parietal and dorsal prefrontal cortex (PFC) system (Goel, 
2007). Furthermore, Goel and Dolan (2003b) identified systems for dealing with 
information that conflict with beliefs; this conflict often leads to a phenomenon termed 
belief-bias. Belief-bias occurs when participants choose an answer consistent with their 
beliefs but inconsistent with the underlying logical structure of the arguments. According 
to Goel and Dolan (2003b), proper detection of this conflict requires the right PFC, 
whereas susceptibility to a bias is connected to activation in the right ventromedial PFC 
(vmPFC). 
Regarding the effect of determinacy, lesion and neuroimaging studies have shown 
that there are two distinct neural systems for dealing with certain and uncertain 
information (Goel et al., 2007). Goel et al. (2007) found that patients with focal lesions 
in the left PFC were impaired on reasoning trials with complete information; in contrast, 
patients with focal lesions to the right PFC were impaired on trials with incomplete 
information (this was also inadvertently demonstrated in Parsons and Osherson (2001), 
see Goel (2007) for an explanation). 
Lastly, while examining the effect of emotion on logical processes, Goel and 
Dolan (2003a), found that reasoning with emotional content was associated with 
activation in the bilateral vmPFC, whereas neutral syllogisms were associated with 
activation in the dorsolateral PFC. Goel and Dolan (2003a), also reports that patients with 
damage to the vmPFC experienced significant impairments emotionally and socially (see 
Anderson et al, 2000). 
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How Lesion Studies Compliment Neuroimaging Techniques 
	  
Neuroimaging studies have found that the neural substrates of reasoning consist  
of a fractionated system composed of various brain systems dependent on the 
particularities of the reasoning task (Goel, 2007). These studies provide evidence for the 
sufficiency of these systems. However, certain inferences cannot be made from fMRI 
studies. For instance, even though a reasoning task may be correlated to activation in a 
particular brain area, it is not clear whether that area is necessary for task performance 
because areas not pertinent to the task itself may become activated due to connections to 
regions necessary for a task (Rorden & Karnath, 2004). In addition, fMRI cannot detect 
the importance of regions that are always active irrespective of task—just because an area 
does not show a significant modulation of blood-flow during a task does not mean it does 
not support task performance (“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence!”)  
(Rorden & Karnath, 2004). Furthermore, it is important to note that the way imaging  
data is processed (i.e. timing, contrasts used, kinds of responses analyzed—correct versus 
incorrect, baselines used etc.) can affect what areas appear in activations, thus accounting 
for some of the variation in results across neuroimaging studies (Goel, 2007). For 
instance, the temporal sequence of activation events in functional imaging studies can 
vary widely based on differences in stimuli timing, thus there is no exacting method for 
understanding the temporal order of events (see Rorden and Karnath, 2004 for a fuller 
treatment of the pros and cons of each both functional imaging and lesion methods). 
With regards to lesion studies, damage is typically heterogeneous, making it very 
difficult obtain several patients with the exact same lesions, thus the power to find 
deficits specific to particular brain structures is limited by the lesion patterns in a given 
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sample. In addition to this, it is also difficult to know how much an individuals brain has 
reorganized or compensated for damage, thus even if there were two patients with 
identical damage, identical recovery or reorganization may not occur. Given the 
limitations of neuroimaging and lesion methods, it is important to use as many techniques 
as possible to fully understand and investigate the anatomy and temporality of brain 
functions (Rorden & Karnath, 2004). 
Lesion studies help compliment fMRI studies by revealing the neural systems and 
structures necessary for reasoning. FMRI studies can only tell us what brain areas are 
involved in a process, whereas the lesion method can help us infer if an area is required. 
Furthermore, lesion studies circumvent technical limitations of using fMRI on brain 
injury patients. For instance, fMRI might fail to detect brain activity in lesion patients due 
to reduced brain metabolism to damaged areas or excessive blood flow to neighboring 
areas (referred to as “luxury perfusion”) (Rorden & Karnath, 2004). Therefore, a 
functioning area may not show robust activation patterns due to poor blood flow patterns. 
Thus, the lesion method avoids this complication by not having to account for signal loss 
due to reduced blood flow. 
In contrast, fMRI offers the advantage of offering more analysis opportunities due 
to the fact lesion patients are less common than the general population of non-brain 
damaged individuals. And despite limitations in the temporal sequence of activation 
events, fMRI gives neuroscientists the tools necessary to understand the approximate 
order of activation events. Therefore, both activation and lesion studies have strengths 
and weakness, and both can be seen as complimentary and vital for uncovering brain 
regions and networks responsible for reasoning processes. Unfortunately, very little 
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lesion data has been published in the domain of reasoning (see Goel et al. (2007) and 
Waechter, Goel, Raymont, Kruger, & Grafman (2013) for examples). Thus, even though 
we know much about the temporal sequence of brain activations during reasoning, it is 
not clear what brain systems are vital for logical reasoning. This lesion study seeks to add 
clarity to this issue in addition to complementing neuroimaging findings with patient  
data. 
	  
	  
Purpose and Hypotheses 
	  
The aim of the present study is to help validate and clarify previous findings 
derived from neuroimaging studies of healthy, normal subjects, in addition to uncovering 
how brain damage affects reasoning abilities. Specifically, this study seeks to investigate 
how brain lesions affect conditional reasoning, and in particular, how it affects 
conditional reasoning as manipulated along the dimensions of familiarity (familiar and 
unfamiliar), belief-congruency (congruent and incongruent), and emotion (emotional 
versus non-emotional). The main objectives were to 1) establish what neural structures 
are necessary to successfully solve conditional problems, 2) delineate the brain systems 
required to carry out reasoning along the aforementioned dimensions and compare 
findings to the neuroimaging literature. 
We tested three hypotheses: 1) that the left hemisphere patients would perform 
poorly with familiar conditionals relative to the right hemisphere group and controls; 2) 
that left hemisphere patients would not benefit from the effect of congruent conditionals, 
whereas controls and right hemisphere patients with intact left hemispheres would benefit 
from congruent content; and 3) that lesions to the LMPFC would impair reasoning with 
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emotional content, but that reasoning with familiar content and unfamiliar content should 
not be affected. 
Method 
Patient Selection 
The present study is based on archival data collected between 2004-2006 as part 
of the Vietnam head injury study (VHIS) (see Raymont, Salazar, Krueger, & Grafman 
(2011) for more details about VHIS). All patients and controls were male and veterans of 
the Vietnam War. During service, patients suffered head trauma and controls remained 
intact. 
This study is part of the research project “Vietnam Head Injury Study – Phase III: 
A 30-Year Post-Injury Follow-up Study.” It received ethics approval from the Office of 
Research Ethics, and protocol approval from the Institutional Review Board of the 
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke. All controls and patients gave 
written informed consent prior to participation. 
In order to aid with comparisons of findings to existing neuroimaging literature 
and avoid confounds due to handedness, only right-handed individuals and right-handed 
but forcibly left (due to injury) were included in this analysis (left-handed, ambidextrous, 
and left-handed but forcibly right were excluded). To control for extent of damage, 
patients with less than 1 cm3 or greater than 100 cm3 of volume loss were excluded. 
Furthermore, to examine differential contributions of each hemisphere, patients with 
bilateral lesions were excluded, leaving 39 unilateral left and 33 unilateral, right lesion 
patients (See Figures 1-2 for the lesion patterns of these two groups and Table 4 for 
average volume loss). Thirty-four, right-handed controls who were also Vietnam veterans 
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were used as a comparison group in all statistical analyses of the data. 
	  
 
	  
Figure 1. Overlay of damaged areas across all right hemisphere patients (n =39). Color 
indicates number of overlapping lesions. Images overlaid on a Damasio template, (R=L). 
	  
 
Figure 2. Overlay of damaged areas across all left hemisphere patients (n = 33, L=R). 
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Materials and Procedure 
	  
	  
	  
The task was administered through SuperLab Stimulus Presentation Software 
(Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA). Before the experiment, participants were given an 
explanation of the nature of deductive reasoning and the task, and received several 
practice questions with the solutions. For the task, participants were instructed to 
determine the validity of each conclusion based on the premises by pressing ‘C’ if they 
thought it was valid or ‘M’ for not valid. For each trial, the premises and the conclusion 
were presented together on screen, and remained until a response was inputted. 
Participants were given unlimited time to complete each trial. Half the trials were valid, 
and the rest were either invalid or indeterminate. To avoid order effects, all trials were 
randomized, and the presentation of blocks counterbalanced. 
Thus, a total of 12 conditional items (6 valid [determinate] and 6 invalid 
[indeterminate]) were analyzed. The first factor analyzed, familiarity (half valid), 
consisted of two levels, unfamiliar (4 non-emotional and 4 emotional combined) and 
unfamiliar (4 abstract). The second factor, congruency (half valid), had two levels, with 4 
congruent items (when the validity of the conclusion and believability align; e.g., valid 
and believable or invalid and unbelievable) and 4 incongruent items (when the validity of 
the conclusion and believability do not align). The third factor analyzed, emotion (half 
valid), consisted of three levels with 4 items in each: emotional, non-emotional, and no 
content (see Table 1 for an example of these items and Table 3 for an item count in each 
factor). 
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Form Non-emotional 
Content 
No 
Content 
Emotional Content 
MP 
(determinate) 
	  
	  
	  
MT 
(determinate) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
AC 
(indeterminate) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
DA 
(indeterminate) 
If a man is fat then he 
is immortal. 
Al Gore is fat. 
Al Gore is immortal. 
(Incongruent) 
If sheep eat shepherds 
then they will have 
golden fleece. 
There are no sheep 
with golden fleece. 
There are no sheep 
that eat shepherds. 
(Congruent) 
If there are Olympic 
Games then there are 
marathon runners. 
There are marathon 
runners. 
There are Olympic 
Games. (Incongruent) 
If gazelles have 
hooves then they are 
fast runners. Gazelles 
do not have hooves. 
Gazelles are not fast 
runners. (Congruent) 
If there is A then there is B. 
There is A. 
There is B. 
	  
	  
If there is A then there is B. 
There is no B. 
There is no A. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
If there is A then there is B. 
There is B. 
There is A. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
If there is A then there is B. 
There is no A. 
There is no B. 
If a country has large reserves of oil then 
it may be invaded by America. 
Iraq has large reserves of oil.  
Iraq may be invaded by America. 
(Congruent) 
If someone supports abortion then they 
are a murderers 
Democrats are not murderers 
Democrats do not support abortion. 
(Incongruent) 
	  
	  
	  
If there are terrorist attacks against 
America then there will be a war. 
There is a war. 
There are terrorist attacks against 
America. (Incongruent) 
	  
	  
If you are American then you abuse 
POWs. 
The Vietnamese are not American. 
The Vietnamese do not abuse POWs. 
(Congruent) 
Table 1. All conditional items (12 trials) presented during task. 
	  
The four conditional forms included two valid forms: modus ponens (MP) and 
modus tollens (MT); and the two fallacies, denying the antecedent (DA), and affirming 
the consequent (AC). Each of these forms appeared three times in the set of twelve 
conditional items (see Table 2). 
	  
Conditional Form Form of Premises Form of 
Conclusion 
Determinacy 
Modus Ponens If p then q. 
p. 
q. Determinate 
(valid) 
Modus Tollens If p then q. 
Not q. 
Not p. Determinate 
(valid) 
Affirming the Consequent If p then q. 
q. 
p. Indeterminate 
Denying the Antecedent If p then q. 
Not p. 
Not q. Indeterminate 
Table 2. Example of the form and determinacy of the four conditional forms presented 
during the experiment 
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Main 
Category 
Congruency 
(n = 8) 
Familiarity 
(n = 12) 
Emotion 
(n = 8) 
Subcategories Congruent (n = 4) Familiar (n = 8) Emotional (n = 4) 
Incongruent (n = 4) Unfamiliar (n = 4) Non-emotional (n = 8) 
Table 3. Number of items in each cell for ANOVA analyses 
	  
Neuropsychological Assessment * 
Patients and controls received a battery of neuropsychological assessments, 
reported in Table 4. The scores indicate that the groups’ working memory and IQ are 
within the normal range (the normal range has a mean of 100 with a standard deviation of 
15). Pair-wise comparisons† were used to examine differences in demographic and 
neuropsychological scores between the three groups. There were no significant 
differences between the groups in mean age, number of years of education, or total 
volume loss (between the left and right hemisphere groups). There were no significant 
differences between the left and right hemisphere groups on any of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) measures (p > .22). However, there were significant 
differences between the right hemisphere group and controls on all WAIS-III measures 
with the right hemisphere group performing significantly worse on all measures. But the 
left hemisphere group did not perform significantly different (p > .40) from controls 
except on the Working Memory Index Score (WMIS) (p = .031). 
	  
Pre-injury general intelligence was measured via the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT-7A), which is administered to individuals admitted to the U.S. military. The 
* Adapted from Waechter et al. (2013), which reported a similar assessment from another subset of patients 
in the VHIS study. 
	  
† All comparisons between groups in this section were controlled for false discovery rate (FDR) using the 
adjusted p-value method introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and implemented in the function 
mafdr in the MATLAB Bioinformatics Toolbox Release 2014b (2014). 
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AFQT-7A is standardized and is highly correlated with WAIS IQ scores (Grafman et al., 
1988). Comparisons between the groups revealed no significant differences in pre-injury 
AFQT-7A percentile scores between controls, left hemisphere and right hemisphere 
patient groups (p > .22, Table 4).‡ 
	  
	  
Measure 
	  
Normal controls 
(n = 34) 
	  
Left hemisphere 
patients (n = 33) 
	  
Right hemisphere 
patients (n = 39) 
Age 59.36 (3.99) 58.24 (2.91) 57.97 (2.90) 
Education 15.08 (2.60) 14.89 (2.32) 14.51 (2.46) 
Pre-injury AFQT-7A 67.58 (28.17) 66.22 (23.72) 57.02 (28.19) 
Total volume loss cm3 - 25.94 (19.86) 24.73 (18.51) 
WAIS Full IQ 109.3 (11.47) 106.6 (15.20) 101.7 (11.81) 
WAIS Performance IQ 107.3 (12.16) 104.3 (16.22) 98.88 (13.37) 
WAIS Verbal IQ 109.7 (12.57) 107.3 (14.44) 102.7 (12.15) 
WAIS WMIS 105.1 (12.97) 96.93 (13.84) 97.23 (12.07) 
Table 4. Demographic and neuropsychological mean (standard deviation) scores across 
the three participant groups. AFQT-7A: Armed Forces Qualification Test percentile rank; 
WAIS represents the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III. 
	  
CT Data Acquisition and Characterization of Lesion Location and Extent § 
	  
All brain scans were acquired with a General Electric Medical Systems Light 
Speed Plus CT scanner in helical mode (150 slices per image). Images were reconstructed 
with an in-plane voxel size of 0.4 x 0.4 mm, overlapping slice thickness of 2.5 mm, and a 
1 mm slice interval. Skull and scalp components were removed using the Brain  
Extraction Tool (BET) algorithm incorporated in MEDx (Medical Numerics Inc.) (Smith, 
2002). Patient CT volumes were imported into ABLe (Analysis of Brain Lesions;  
Makale et al., 2002; Solomon et al., 2007) and displayed as a series of slices in a  
Lightbox viewer. A trained neuropsychiatrist (V. R.) manually traced the lesions on all 
‡ All comparisons between groups in this section were controlled for false discovery rate (FDR) using the 
adjusted p-value method introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and implemented in the function 
mafdr in the MATLAB Bioinformatics Toolbox Release 2014b (2014). 
	  
§ Adapted from Raymont, Greathouse, Reding, Lipsky, Salazar, and Grafman (2008); and Waechter et al. 
(2013), which reports how the images were originally processed. 
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relevant slices. The tracings were then reviewed by neuropsychologist J. G., enabling a 
consensus regarding the limits of each lesion. Lesion volume was calculated and the brain 
images automatically registered to a template brain in Talairach space (Talairach and 
Tournoux, 1988). The template image was derived from a CT scan of a 27-year-old  
male, and a MRI of a 27-year-old male, transformed to Talairach space using a12- 
parameter affine linear transformation using the Automated Image Registration (AIR) 
algorithm in MEDx (Woods, Cherry, and Mazziotta, 1992; Makale et al., 2002). The 
volume was resliced at 17 degrees relative to the inferior orbitomeatal line, and 11 
transverse slices that best match the Damasio (1989) templates were selected by a 
neuroradiologist and interactively labeled with Brodmann areas (BA) by reference to the 
Damasio templates. Although the locations of BAs in these templates are approximate, 
they are widely accepted in the neuropsychology and neurology communities. Lesion 
location and volume were determined using the previously described template volume as 
a reference in ABLe (MEDx version 3.44, Medical Numerics Inc.). Labels for lesion 
location were derived from the Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas in ABLe (Makale  
et al., 2002; Tzourio-Mazoyera et al., 2002; Solomon et al., 2007). 
	  
Voxel-Based Lesion Symptom Mapping Analysis 
	  
Reasoning scores and CT lesion tracings were entered into ABLe (version 2.8b) 
for a voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) analysis using FDR (q = .05, which 
keeps the false positive rate at 5%) correction for multiple comparisons (see Solomon et 
al. (2002) for a description of this technique in section 3.3). T-tests were computed for 
clusters with a minimum of 10 contiguous voxels (k = 10) containing at least three 
patients with overlapping damage. Each t-test compared performance of patients with 
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damage affecting a given cluster (k = 10) to patients with damage outside that cluster, or 
if normal controls were selected as the comparison group, each cluster was compared to 
controls. 
	  
	  
Results 
VLSM Analysis 
A whole brain VLSM analysis conducted in ABLe isolated a lesion cluster with 
	  
ten patients exhibiting decreased performance on emotional conditionals in comparison to 
controls and other patients in the left medial PFC (LMPFC, see Figure 7 for details). This 
cluster appeared in two separate contrasts: 1) all emotional conditionals (uncorrected) 
where selected patients (cluster size k = 358 voxels) performed worse than controls (two- 
tailed p = .045) and non-selected patients (two-tailed p = .019); and 2) emotional 
determinate items (FDR corrected, k = 254 voxels) where selected patients performed 
worse than controls (p = .0096) and non-selected patients (p = .00034). A total of 10 
unique patients appeared in these clusters, and their neuropsychological and demographic 
characteristics can be seen in Table 5. No other brain areas were selected by ABLe for 
emotional conditionals, thus this damage to this brain area was specifically related to 
impairments on emotional conditionals. 
Beyond emotional conditionals, ABLe isolated a total 18 different clusters 
associated deficits in emotion, familiarity, and congruency in the conditional reasoning 
task. The majority of these clusters appeared in the left hemisphere, and in particular the 
frontal lobes and left temporal lobes. The few clusters that appeared in the right 
hemisphere did not exhibit deficits for the same contrasts as the left hemisphere clusters 
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(in fact, there were a few right hemisphere clusters that showed improved performance in 
comparison to the rest of the lesion patients). Thus, since there was a pattern of laterality 
consistent with the literature (Goel, 2007), it was decided to examine the hemispheres as 
a whole by comparing groups based on hemisphere of damage with ANOVA tests in 
order to examine interactions between hemisphere of damage and levels of each main 
factor since VLSM is limited to pair-wise comparisons and cannot perform factorial 
ANOVAs. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 3. Lesion map produced in VLSM analysis for impairment associated specifically 
with emotional conditionals. This cluster spans the left superior and medial PFC 
(Talairach coordinates: -32, 44, 2 visualized on an MNI brain template). 
	  
	  
	  
Neuropsychological Characterization of the LMPFC Group 
	  
Pairwise comparisons between the LMPFC group selected by ABLe and the right 
hemisphere group, and the LMFPC group and controls** and revealed no significant 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
**   The results for the pairwise comparisons between the right hemisphere group and controls are 
reported in the first section covering the neuropsychological characteristics of the groups. As 
noted in that section, there were significant differences between the right hemisphere group and 
controls on the WAIS-III IQ measures presented there. 
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differences in pre-injury AFQT-7A percentile scores, age, education, total brain volume 
loss, or any WAIS-III measure presented in Table 5 (p > .36).†† 
	  
	  
	  
Measure 
Left PFC 
patients (n =10) 
Right hemisphere 
patients (n = 39) 
Normal controls 
(n = 34) 
Age 58.9 (1.36) 57.97 (2.90) 59.36 (3.99) 
Education 14.1 (0.52) 14.51 (2.46) 15.08 (2.60) 
Pre-injury AFQT-7A 68.44 (6.73) 57.02 (28.19) 67.58 (28.17) 
Total brain volume loss cm3 2.865 (0.48) 24.73 (18.51) - 
WAIS Full IQ 111.6 (5.01) 101.7 (11.81) 109.3 (11.47) 
WAIS Performance IQ 110.9 (5.26) 98.88 (13.37) 107.3 (12.16) 
WAIS Verbal IQ 109.6 (4.33) 102.7 (12.15) 109.7 (12.57) 
WAIS WMIS 99 (4.22) 97.23 (12.07) 105.1 (12.97) 
	  
Table 5. Demographic and neuropsychological mean (standard deviation) scores for the 
LMPFC group and comparison groups. 
	  
	  
Behavioural Performance 
	  
	  
Analyses of parametric assumptions. 
	  
Given the small number of reasoning items in each category (4-8), we performed 
an exploratory data analysis looking at the normality and variance of each s distribution 
of scores in order to assess whether score distributions violated parametric test 
assumptions. Since there were 21 distributions to consider, the results of that analysis are 
not reported here, but can be viewed in Appendix A. To summarize the results here, there 
were no violations of normality as indicated by non-significant Levene’s test for the 
equality of variances (see Appendix A for details of each result between each group for 
each ANOVA analysis). There were significant departures from normality as indicated 
	  
	  
†† All comparisons between groups in this section were controlled for false discovery rate (FDR) 
using the adjusted p-value method introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and 
implemented in the function mafdr in the MATLAB Bioinformatics Toolbox Release 2014b 
(2014). 
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by significant Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, but diagnostic tests such as kurtosis and 
skewness recommended by Field (2013) showed that none of the departures were 
extreme. Even though there were departures from normality, there is strong evidence via 
high quality Monte Carlo simulations using sample sizes of 25 (with varying effect sizes) 
that ANOVA tests are robust to violations of normality with distributions displaying mild 
skewness and mild to moderate kurtosis (Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, and Bühner, 
2010; a more recent Monte Carlo simulation study by Ferreira, Rocha & Mequelino 
(2012) confirms that ANOVA is equally as robust to violations of normality in 
comparison to the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, which is considered far less 
powerful). Therefore, we used ANOVA tests rather than nonparametric tests to carry out 
the analyses in the proceeding sections. 
	  
Group by familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar). 
	  
Based on neuroimaging studies, we hypothesized that the left hemisphere patients 
would be more likely to perform poorly with familiar conditionals relative to the right 
hemisphere group and controls. A mixed measures ANOVA with Group (Left 
Hemisphere, Right Hemisphere, Controls) as the independent variable and Familiarity 
(All Familiar, All Unfamiliar) as the repeated measures variable revealed a significant 
interaction between Group x Familiarity, F(2, 103) = 4.65, p = .012, η2 = .083 (see Figure 
4). This interaction indicates that the reasoning accuracy across the two levels of 
Familiarity differed in the groups. Specifically, a follow-up one-way ANOVA showed a 
significant difference between the groups on conditionals with familiar content, F(2, 103) 
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= 6.39, p = .002, η2 = .11.
‡‡  
Planned contrasts revealed that the left hemisphere lesion 
group scored significantly lower than controls (p = .047, r = .19) and right hemisphere 
	  
patients (p = .002, r = .35) on problems with familiarity (see Figure 4 for mean 
comparisons and Appendix B for a description of the effect sizes reported here). A 
follow-up one-way ANOVA showed no group differences on unfamiliar items, F(2, 103) 
	  
= .079, p = . 924. Furthermore, there was no significant main effect for Familiarity, 
	  
F(1,103) = .874, p = .352, r = .09, or Group, F(2, 103) = 1.97, p = .145, η2 = .037. 
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Figure 4. Significant group by familiarity interaction. Error bars represent standard errors. 
	  
Group by congruency (all congruent vs. all incongruent). 
	  
Our second hypothesis was that left hemisphere patients would probably not 
benefit from the effect of congruent conditionals, whereas controls and right hemisphere 
patients with intact left hemispheres would benefit from congruent content. To test this, a 
	  
	  
‡‡ The effect size reported here is eta squared which was calculated as the sum of squares of the effect 
divided by the total sum of squares of the model (SS2effect/SS2total), and not partial eta squared (sum of 
squares of the effect divided by SS2effect + SS2error, this reduces the denominator creating an inflated effect 
size that cannot be accurately compared across studies) that is normally seen in SPSS output (see Field 
(2013) and Cohen (1973) for an explanation). 
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mixed measures ANOVA with Group (Left Hemisphere, Right Hemisphere, Controls) as 
the independent variable and Congruency (All Congruent, All Incongruent) as the 
repeated measures variable revealed a significant interaction between Group x 
Congruency, F(2, 103) = 4.11, p = .019, η2 = .062 (see Figure 5). Specifically, there was 
a significant difference between the groups on congruent problems, F(2, 103) = 12.75, p 
< .001, η2 = .20. Since group sizes were not equal, Hochberg’s GT2 pairwise test 
	  
procedure designed for unequal group sizes was used for post hoc comparisons (Field, 
2013). This analysis indicated that the left hemisphere lesion group performed worse on 
congruent items in comparison to controls (mean difference = -.14, p = .006). The left 
hemisphere group also performed worse than right hemisphere patients (mean difference 
= -.21, p < .001). There were no significant difference between the right hemisphere 
patients and controls (p = .23). Lastly, there were no significant differences between the 
groups on incongruent items F(2, 103) = .28, p = .76. 
There was significant main effect for Congruency, F(1,103) = 20.69, p < .001, r = 
.41, with congruent conditionals being easier to solve (Mcongruent = 59%) than incongruent 
conditionals (Mincongruent = 47%). Finally, there was a significant main effect of Group, 
F(2, 103) = 6.16, p = .003, η2 = .107 . Hotchberg GT2 post hoc comparisons showed that 
overall, left hemisphere patients performed significantly worse than right hemisphere 
patients (mean difference = - .13, p = .002). But there was no difference between left 
patients and controls (mean difference = -.07, p = .13) or right patients and controls 
(mean difference -.05, p = .39). 
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Figure 5. Significant group by congruency interaction, and main effect of group and 
congruency. 
	  
	  
Group by emotion. 
	  
Since there was only one brain cluster in the Left MPFC identified by ABLe as 
being pertinent to conditional reasoning with emotional items, the following behavioural 
analysis only included left hemisphere patients with LMPFC lesions and compared them 
to right hemisphere patients and controls. Our hypothesis was that lesions to the LMPFC 
would specifically impair reasoning with emotional content, but that reasoning with 
familiar content and unfamiliar content should not be affected. 
A mixed measures ANOVA with Group (Left MPFC, Right Hemisphere, 
Controls) as the independent variable and Emotion (Emotional, Familiar, Unfamiliar) as 
the repeated measures variable revealed a significant interaction between Group x 
Emotion, F(3.69, 147.69) = 2.54, p = .046, η2 = .059 (see Figure 10). Follow-up one-way 
ANOVAs showed no significant group differences on any of the levels (p > .4) except for 
Emotional conditionals, F(2, 80) = 3.78, p = .027, η2 = .086. This suggests that the groups 
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performed similarly on the other two levels without emotional conditionals, thus the 
effect of emotion drove this interaction. Hochberg GT post hoc tests indicated that 
LMPFC patients performed significantly worse on emotional conditionals than right 
hemisphere patients (mean difference = -.21, 1-tailed [since this hypothesis was 
directional] p = .011), and worse at a trend level in comparison to controls (mean 
difference = -.17, 1-tailed p = .053). There was no difference between controls and right 
hemisphere patients on emotional conditionals (mean difference = -.04, 1-tailed p = .75). 
Lastly, there was no significant main effect for Emotion, F(1.85, 147.69) = .636, p = 
.519, η2  = .007, or Group, F(2, 80) = 1.22, p = .30, η2 = .029. 
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Figure 6. Group performance on conditionals with different levels of emotion. Significant 
group by emotion interaction. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Discussion 
	  
	  
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of lesions in the left and 
right hemispheres in resolving conditional reasoning problems while varying different 
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aspects of content such as familiarity, belief congruency, and emotion. As predicted,  
there were significant interactions between group membership and content for each of the 
content manipulations investigated. Before considering the particulars of these results, it 
is important to address the question of whether or not participants were performing at 
chance since several of the groups performed between 35% - 60%. 
To understand the scores that look like chance performance, it is important to 
delve into the logical forms that lead to these accuracy rates. It is well established in the 
conditional literature that performance on the indeterminate forms is quite often below 
that of chance with endorsement rates vary from approximately 56% for AC and 49.5% 
for DA; whereas endorsement rates vary more frequently above chance on the 
determinate forms from close to 100% for MP to 65% for MT (see the meta-analysis by 
Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2001; also see Noveck and Politzer, 1998). For 
example, in a neuroimaging study by Noveck et al. (2004), endorsement for the 
determinate form MP equaled 94% and MT = 77%, whereas for the indeterminate forms, 
endorsement for AC = 29% and DA = 31%, thus there is a clear division in difficulty 
between the determinate and indeterminate forms. Part of the explanation for this pattern 
is that AC and DA are considered logical fallacies, and many intelligent participants 
endorse them rather than reject them as being inconclusive due to problems thinking of 
counterfactuals (i.e. examples that would falsify the conclusion) (Oaksford and Chater, 
2010). Consider the following AC argument used in this study: 
If there are terrorist attacks against America then there will be a war. 
There is a war. 
There are terrorist attacks against America. 
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In addition, inductive arguments have this particular form, therefore, it could be that the 
participants in this study treated the indeterminate forms like inductive arguments where 
they infer general rules from examples easily generated from everyday experiences 
(Angluin & Smith, 1983). Thus, the strategy employed to solve these problems would be 
appropriate in the context of an inductive reasoning problem. 
The performance across each group for each familiar conditional form is depicted 
in Figure 7. It is clear the endorsement rates for each form are in line with the literature 
with lower endorsement rating for the indeterminate forms than the determinate forms. 
For AC, group endorsement ranges from 19% to 22%, meaning each group in this study 
failed to recognize the logical fallacy and answer correctly (i.e. false). Endorsement 
responses for DA range from 23% to 47%. Figures 7 depicts performance on the four 
conditional forms and Figure 8 depicts endorsement rates for both familiar and unfamiliar 
conditionals, the discrepancy in performance rates between the determinate and 
indeterminate forms is clear. For instance, determinate accuracy ranging from 59% to 
83% is much higher than indeterminate accuracy, which ranges from 23% to 44%. Thus  
it is clear when the two forms (indeterminate and determinate) are combined that  
accuracy rates suffer and come close to chance (50%) performance. The reason why the 
main analyses were not broken into determinate and indeterminate forms is because we 
did not have enough items for each contrast (emotion, congruency, familiarity) to break 
them into these component forms. In closing, performance patterns across the groups in 
this study are in line with the cognitive and neuroimaging literature, therefore, 
participants were not performing at chance on each level of determinacy in the emotional, 
familiar, and congruent factors. Thus performance can be explained by the differential 
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impact of determinate and indeterminate logical forms rather than in the inability to do 
the task. Beyond this explanation, see Appendix C for a demonstration of how the 
binomial theorem accounts for the “chance” level performance seen in these groups. 
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Figure 7. Performance on the different unfamiliar conditional forms (two items per form). 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 8. Performance on all familiar and unfamiliar determinate (MP and MT) and 
indeterminate (AC and DA) conditionals. Error bars represent the standard error of the 
mean. 
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Also to be noted, in the results concerning congruency and familiarity, the left 
hemisphere group performed worse than the controls and right hemisphere group, and 
since the left hemisphere group performed significantly worse than controls (there was no 
difference between the two patient groups) on the working memory measure, ANCOVAs 
were run to see if the effect would hold when it was added as a covariate. We retained the 
same pattern of significance when it was added as a covariate, showing that working 
memory could not account for the effect. Therefore, lesions in the left hemisphere drove 
this effect rather than working memory deficits. It is important to note that the right 
hemisphere group also had a significantly lower working memory than the controls, yet 
their performance was greater than the controls in these conditions (see Figures 4 and 5). 
	  
The Effect of Familiar Content 
	  
The result regarding the effect of content on reasoning replicates previous  
findings (to name a few, Goel & Dolan, 2003a; Goel & Dolan, 2003b; Goel, 2007; Houde 
et al., 2000; Knauff et al., 2002; Noveck, Goel, & Smith, 2004) that the left hemisphere is 
primarily responsible for reasoning with familiar content. As hypothesized, this study 
observed a significant interaction whereby left hemisphere lesion patients performed 
worse on familiar conditionals. This finding is in line with patient studies implicating the 
left hemisphere as being critical to logical reasoning and inferential processes 
(Caramazza, Gordon, Zurif, & Deluca, 1976; Gazzaniga and Smylie, 1984; Langdon & 
Warrington, 2000; Read, 1981; Whitaker, Markovits, Savary, Grou, & Braun, 1991). 
For instance, in a study by Landgon and Warrington (2000), it was found that left 
hemisphere patients failed the verbal category (recognize an item that belongs to a 
different category from other items) and analogy (choose a word that has the same 
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relation to the test word as the sample pair) tasks whereas both left and right hemisphere 
patients failed the spatial reasoning task. They summarized this finding as evidence for 
the essential role of the left hemisphere in both verbal and spatial reasoning. In addition 
to this, Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000) point out that the largely left-lateralized 
network in these imaging and lesion studies seems to indicate that the left hemisphere is 
“necessary and often sufficient for logical reasoning, [while the] right hemisphere is 
sometimes necessary but never sufficient.” 
With regards to familiar versus unfamiliar content, in a review by Goel (2007), it 
was noted that the network for familiar, content-based reasoning consists of a left- 
lateralized frontal-temporal network, whereas a bilateral parietal visuospatial system (BA 
7, 40) is responsible for reasoning with unfamiliar or content-free material. Upon closer 
inspection of the lesion patterns in our right hemisphere group, we only had 12 patients 
with damage to either BA 7 or 40, with only 9 patients with damage to both and only 5 
having more than 2% of both BAs damaged. Thus, our sample may not have adequate 
power to detect the effect of damage to these structures in addition to the fact that only 
half the network was damaged. In addition to this, a couple of neuroimaging studies have 
shown that in the case of content-free conditionals presented in the same format as this 
study (in particular, modus ponens and modus tollens), that an exclusively left-lateralized 
network is recruited to successfully solve content-free conditionals (Noveck, Goel, & 
Smith, 2004; Prado, Van Der Henst, Noveck, 2010). Therefore, one might also expect to 
see impairments in the left hemisphere group on unfamiliar conditionals. But as with the 
right hemisphere group, there were only 6 patients with damage to BA 7, and 10 patients 
with damage to BA 40, and only 5 patients with damage to both, therefore, there may not 
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have been enough power to detect if damage to these areas affected reasoning with 
unfamiliar content. Therefore, having part of the bilateral network intact on either side 
seems to preserve the ability to reason with unfamiliar material, leading to the conclusion 
that perhaps bilateral damage is necessary to impair content-free reasoning. Thus it can 
be concluded that the network for reasoning with unfamiliar content has a built in 
redundancy in the sense that several parts need to breakdown in order for it to 
malfunction. 
	  
Belief-Logic Congruency 
	  
Regarding the effect of congruency on reasoning, our results confirm previous 
research regarding reasoning with belief congruent and incongruent content (Goel et. al., 
2000; Goel & Dolan, 2003a; Rotello & Heit, 2014; Tsujii et. al., 2010) and provide 
additional evidence for the role of the left hemisphere in belief-laden reasoning. The 
results indicated that the left hemisphere patients did not benefit from the effect of belief- 
congruent content, they performed significantly worse than right hemisphere patients but 
there was no significant difference between left hemisphere patients and controls. And all 
three groups performed similarly on incongruent (belief-logic contradictory) trials. This 
finding is consistent with Tsujii et al.’s (2010) finding that TMS disruption to the right 
inferior PFC increased the accuracy on congruent trials while disruption to the left IPFC 
eliminated accuracy advantage for congruent trials, meaning accuracy across congruent 
and incongruent trials was about the same. Interestingly, in our findings, controls did not 
perform significantly better than left hemisphere patients, so the effect seems to be driven 
by the increase in accuracy rates seen in right hemisphere patients because they have an 
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intact left hemisphere with less inhibition from the right hemisphere on the left, which 
might help facilitate left hemisphere reasoning with congruent items. 
Upon closer inspection of performance rates for congruent and incongruent items, 
it becomes clear that the right hemisphere group is primarily responding based on 
believability since accuracy rates go down for incongruent items, meaning they are  
biased towards their beliefs and answer inaccurately in the incongruent condition with the 
bias being more clear in the congruent condition where they go with their beliefs more 
often than left hemisphere patients and controls, while the left hemisphere group, 
analogous to left TMS inhibition/disruption, do not gain the accuracy advantage that 
congruent trials should facilitate (see Figure 5). As noted by Goel (2007), the role of the 
right hemisphere is belief-biased conditions is to suppress this bias mechanism, but 
because of damage to these suppression areas, they respond more strongly to the content 
of the arguments rather than the logical form. 
The Effect of Emotional Content 
	  
Using VLSM whole brain analysis, emotionally salient content resulted in the 
significant correlation of reasoning deficits associated with lesions in the LMPFC. The 
results indicated that the LMPFC patients were impaired on emotionally salient 
conditionals compared to right hemisphere patients and controls. There were no 
significant differences between groups on non-emotional familiar or unfamiliar 
conditionals, thus the deficit was specific to emotional conditionals. This finding is 
consistent with previous neuroimaging studies that point to the importance of the Left 
Ventromedial PFC (VMPFC) in emotional reasoning (Goel & Dolan, 2003a; Smith, 
Vartanian, Goel, 2014). The finding that the LMPFC patients were impaired on reasoning 
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with emotionally salient conditionals is important because this is the first time conditional 
forms have been analyzed with emotionally salient material in both imaging and lesion 
studies. Thus this result seems to indicate that the LMPFC is critical to reasoning with 
emotional content above and beyond logical form (i.e. syllogisms, conjunctions, etc.) 
	  
Limitations 
	  
There were a few limitations in this study. First, our results mainly demonstrated 
that left hemisphere lesion patients were selectively impaired reasoning with content and 
congruent material. We were not able to find any group differences with respect to 
unfamiliar content, part of the reason for this may be that the areas necessary for 
reasoning with unfamiliar, abstract content depends on a bilateral network rather than the 
unilateral network examined in this study. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the discussion 
for familiar and unfamiliar content, there may not have been enough power to find 
clusters using VLSM pertaining to networks associated familiar, unfamiliar, congruent, 
and incongruent contrasts due to the fact we did not have enough patients with 
overlapping damage to areas associated with these contrasts. Lastly, there may be 
concerns regarding the low number of test items in each category (4-8), and the strength 
of inferences based on such low number. One statistical model that has been shown to be 
robust with for use on a limited range of data is the proportional odds logistic regression 
model (Parsons, Costa, Achten, and Stallard, 2009). With this model, a low number of 
test items can be used to draw reliable inferences with our group sizes (approximately 30 
in this case). It works well with data that is not normally distributed or continuous as in 
the case of our data. Therefore, for more accurate parameter estimates given present data, 
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this regression model will be used to re-test all results, thus some of the p-values may 
change, but the pattern of significance and group differences should remain stable. 
	  
	  
Conclusion 
	  
In summary, our findings point to the critical role of the left hemisphere for 
conditionals with content in general, and more specifically content with belief-congruent 
conclusions. Whereas content and belief-congruent conclusions was generally impacted 
by left hemisphere damage, the finding that emotional content is specific to the LMPFC 
supports research showing that this region is important for processing conditional 
arguments with emotional content, including during conditional reasoning. We provide 
additional evidence for the lateralization of reasoning processes, and in particular support 
the observation made by Goel et al. (2000) that the left hemisphere is “necessary and 
often sufficient for logical reasoning, [while the] right hemisphere is sometimes 
necessary but never sufficient,” and the finding that the LMPFC plays a special role in 
the processing of emotional content (Goel & Dolan, 2003a). 
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Appendix A. Assessment of Parametric Assumptions and Normality Plots 
Group by familiarity (familiar, unfamiliar) 
Normality was assessed by looking at the skewness and kurtosis of familiar and 
	  
unfamiliar trials in each group, the scores of both patient groups was normally distributed 
as indicated by non-significant skewness (p > .01 or z ≤ ±2.58); but the controls had 
significantly skewed (z = -3.33) and significant kurtosis (z = 4.5) on familiar scores, and 
significant kurtosis (z = 5.10) on unfamiliar scores, hence the control scores violated 
assumptions of normality. The only problem with kurtosis in the patient groups occurred 
with the right hemisphere scores on unfamiliar items (z = 3.12). Furthermore, normality 
was also assessed with Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, which indicated that all score 
distributions were not normally distributed (p < .01) except for the distribution of left 
hemisphere familiar scores (see below for normality plots). Equality of variances was 
tested with Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, which showed equal variances 
across all groups in both conditions (p > .5). 
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Content by Group Charts 
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Group by congruency (all congruent vs. all incongruent) 
	  
	  
	  
Normality was assessed by looking at the skewness and kurtosis in the 
distribution of all congruent and all incongruent trials for each group. The distribution of 
scores in each condition for both patient groups did not show any significant skewness or 
kurtosis (p > .01 or z ≤ ±2.58). The only distribution of scores showing problems with 
normality was the controls scores in the congruent condition, with significant kurtosis (z 
= 4.14); the rest of control scores exhibited normal skewness and kurtosis (p > .01 or z ≤ 
	  
±2.58). Furthermore, normality was also assessed with the Shapiro-Wilk tests of 
normality, which indicated that all score distributions (for each level and each group) 
were not normally distributed (p < .01). Equality of variances was tested with Levene’s 
test for homogeneity of variances, which showed equal variances across all groups in 
both conditions (p > .7). 
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Congruency by Group Charts 
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Group by emotion (emotional, non-emotional familiar, non-emotional 
unfamiliar) 
	  
Normality was assessed by looking at the skewness and kurtosis in the  
distribution of all emotional, all non-emotional familiar, and all non-emotional unfamiliar 
scores for each group. The distribution of scores for emotional conditionals for all three 
groups did not show any significant skewness or kurtosis (p > .01 or z ≤ ±2.58). For the 
unfamiliar scores, the only significant deviation from normality occurred in the kurtosis  
of controls scores (z = 5.10) and the kurtosis of right hemisphere scores (z = 3.12). Lastly, 
there was significant kurtosis in the distribution of familiar scores for controls (z = 3.13) 
and LPFC hemisphere patients (z = 2.78). Furthermore, normality was also assessed with 
the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, which indicated that all score distributions (for each 
level and each group) were not normally distributed (p < .01) except for the LPFC scores 
in emotional conditionals. 
Equality of variances was tested with Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, 
which showed equal variances across all groups in all three conditions (p > .15). Also, 
since there were three levels of emotion, Mauchly’s test for the assumption of sphericity 
was consulted, and was significant χ2(2) = .917, p = .032. Therefore degrees of freedom 
were corrected with the Greenhouse-Geisser (GG) estimates of sphericity (ϵ = .923). 
Emotion by Group Charts 
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Appendix B. Effect Sizes 
	  
	  
	  
Correlation coefficient (r): Recommended by Field (2013) to measure the effect size of 
comparisons. The following guidelines are adapted from Field (2013) and 
Hopkins (1997) 
• r = .10 to .30 is considered a small effect, accounting for only 1% (.12*100) to 9% 
of the total experimental variance 
• r = .30 to . 50 is considered a medium effect, accounting for 9% - 25% of the total 
variance 
• r = .50 to .70 is considered a large effect, accounting for 25% - 49% of the total 
variance 
• r = .70 to .90 is considered a very large/huge/high effect size 
• r = .90 to 1.00 is considered nearly infinite 
	  
Eta squared (η2): Cohen suggested the following guidelines (Cohen, 1988): 
• .01 to .05 = small effect 
• .06 to .14 = medium effect 
• .15 and larger = large effect 
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Appendix C: Discussion of the Binomial Probability Distribution with Regards to 
“Chance” Performance 
Regarding the accuracy of all three groups in the different conditional tasks, it 
would seem that all three groups performed at near chance levels on several of the tasks 
(Maccuracy = 46% - 59%), therefore a question that arises is “how can we assess the 
performance of these groups when they seem to be systematically performing at chance 
on the familiar and unfamiliar conditional tasks?” If these groups seem to be responding 
at chance, then each individual in a group can be thought of as flipping a coin and using it 
to choose an input response (see Caramazza, Capitani, Rey, and Berndt (2001) for a 
similar analysis of chance performance of aphasic patients on a binary response 
comprehension task). In this scenario, it can be expected that coin flips would yield 50% 
heads and 50% tails after a number of tosses, however, after a finite series of coin tosses, 
the resulting distribution is unlikely to yield an exact 50% split. In the case of single 
patients or participants, it is hard to make inferences from a small number of trials (i.e. 
less than 20), but as the number of trials increases; inferences from single cases become 
more reliable (Caramazza et. al., 2001). According to the binomial theorem distribution, 
with approximately 4-12 binary problems as in this study, a single subject cannot be 
expected to be answering significantly above chance alone unless their performance 
exceeds that of 75% or falls below 25% (see Figure 7 for an illustration of such a 
binomial probability distribution). Therefore, it is not prudent to expect to draw reliable 
inferences from a single subject on only 8 items. But when the number of subjects 
increases, the probability of getting chance performance using a binomial probability 
distribution significantly decreases. In the case of our data, for unfamiliar conditionals 
with a total of 8 items, and 30 or more subjects per group, the binomial distribution does 
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not contain any probabilities of chance performance that are greater than an alpha of .05 
(see Figure 8 for an illustration of this using the number of controls and the total number 
of response items they solved as a group to construct a binomial distribution), therefore, 
given an alpha of .05 or less, any group performance average, can be considered 
significantly above chance. 
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Figure 9. Binomial probability distribution for 8 items for a single subject. The x-axis 
represents accuracy across 8 trials, and the y-axis represents the binomial probability of 
this accuracy on a binary response task. 
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Figure 10. Binomial probability distribution for 8 unfamiliar items for the 34 controls. All 
possible group percentages fall below a .05 probability making it very unlikely that any 
response pattern is by chance alone. The x-axis represents accuracy across 8 trials, and  
the y-axis represents the binomial probability of this accuracy on a binary response task. 
	  
	  
	  
Thus, as illustrated by the discussion of differential performance on determinate 
and indeterminate items and the binomial probability distribution, the performance 
demonstrated in Figure 8 is significantly different from chance (p < .05), therefore, if 
chance cannot account for this performance pattern then we cannot dismiss it as a fluke. 
In the case of our data, most reasonable explanation is that the indeterminate forms pull 
overall performance rates towards “chance” levels. 
